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ABSTRACT 
 
Across many areas of study in cognition, the capacity of working memory (WM) is 
widely agreed to be roughly 3-5 items: 3-5 objects (i.e., bound collections of object features) in 
the literature on visual WM, or 3-5 role bindings (i.e., objects in specific relational roles) in the 
literature on memory and reasoning. Three experiments investigated the capacity of observers’ 
WM for the spatial relations among objects in a visual display and the results suggest that the 
“items” in WM are neither simply objects nor simply role bindings. The results of Experiment 1 
are most consistent with a model that treats an “item” is visual WM as an object, along with the 
roles of all its relations to one other object. Experiment 2 compared observers’ WM for object 
size to their memory for relative size and provided evidence that observers compute and store 
objects’ relations, per se, (rather than just absolute size) in WM. Experiment 3 tested and 
confirmed several more nuanced predictions of the model supported by Experiment 1. Together, 
these findings suggest that objects are stored in visual WM in pairs (along with all the relations 
between the object in a pair), and that, from the perspective of WM, a given object in one pair is 
not the same “item” at that same object in a different pair.  
Keywords: visual relations, spatial relations, visual working memory, objects, role bindings 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Working memory (WM) is the cognitive resource responsible for the active 
maintenance and manipulation of information. The capacity of WM, which is sharply 
limited, determines how much information one can maintain and manipulate—i.e., how 
much one can perceive or think about— in parallel. As such, the capacity of WM is a key 
bottleneck in perception (Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons & Ambinder, 2005) attention 
(Triesman & Gelade, 1980; Triesman, 1988; Wolfe, 1994) memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1975; Cowan, 2001), reasoning (Halford et al., 2005; Morrison, Holyoak, & Truong, 
2001; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) and virtually everything else we do. Individual 
differences in the capacity of WM have also been linked to various performance 
measures such as fluid intelligence (e.g. Kane & Engle, 2002; Conway et al., 2002; Grey, 
Chabris, & Braver, 2003;  Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005)  
A large body of converging evidence from the literatures on both visual cognition 
and “higher” cognition suggests that, for most people and across a variety tasks, the 
capacity of WM is roughly 3-5 items. This is not to say that there is only a single system 
for working memory, only that the various systems have strikingly similar capacity limits 
(Murray, 1968; Peterson & Johnson, 1971; Levy, 1971; Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 
1975b; Cowan, Wood, Nugent & Treisman, 1997b; Longoni, Richardson,  & Aiello, 
1993; Avons, Wright & Pammer, 1994; Hitch, 1996; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Halford, 
Baker, McCredden, and Bain, 2005; Song & Jiang, 2006; Woodman & Vogel, 2008; see 
Cowan, 2000 and Baddeley, 2003 for reviews). More recent evidence suggests that visual 
WM may also be characterized in terms of the amount and/or quality of information 
stored about the items in WM, rather than strictly the number of those items (e.g. Alvarez 
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& Cavanagh 2004; Alvarez & Oliva 2008; Oliva & Torralba 2006). The work presented 
here does not speak to the distinction between these discrete (i.e., item-based) and 
continuous (i.e., information/quality-based) models of working memory. Instead, we aim 
to elucidate the currency and capacity of WM for the spatial relations among objects in a 
display. This capacity has important implications for our ability to interpret spatial 
layouts, to reason about objects arrayed in scenes, to interpret graphs, to make basic 
judgments about individual pairs of objects (e.g., whether one can fit on top of or inside 
another) and even our ability to visually recognize individual, multi-part objects (e.g., 
Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel, 2001). More importantly for 
our current purposes, understanding the capacity of WM for the spatial relations among 
objects can lend insight to the currency of WM more generally: What are those “items” 
of which we can hold 3-5 in WM? 
According to the literature on visual cognition, the “items” that occupy slots in 
(e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997) or otherwise consume the finite resources of (e.g., Alvarez & 
Cavanaugh, 2004) WM are discussed as objects—i.e., bound collections of object 
features. For example, using a change detection paradigm, Luck and Vogel (1997; 
Experiment 3) varied both the number of objects in the array (two, four or six) and the 
complexity of those objects (i.e., whether the objects were defined by a single feature or a 
conjunction of two features). They found that subjects’ accuracy detecting a change 
between two displays decreased with the number of objects in the displays but not with 
the number of features defining each object. They concluded that the capacity of WM is 
about four objects, regardless of the number of features per object. (More recently, Vogel 
et al., 2001, have revised their estimate down to 2.8 items.) The basic idea is that once an 
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object occupies a slot in WM, additional features on that object can all fit within the same 
slot with little or no additional cost. 
In the literature on memory and reasoning, the capacity of WM is discussed most 
often in terms of role-filler bindings (see Cowan, 2000; Halford et al., 2005; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003). A role-filler binding (or, equivalently, variable-value binding) is a 
binding of one relational role (or variable) to its argument (filler). For example, the 
proposition loves (John, Mary) consists of two such bindings: John bound to lover and 
Mary to beloved. (The proposition loves (Mary, John) specifies the same roles and 
arguments but the bindings are reversed.) The expression 2 = 6/3 consists of three such 
bindings: 2 to result, 6 to numerator and 2 to denominator. The consensus view in this 
literature is that the capacity of WM is roughly 4+1 such bindings (see Cowan, 2000; 
Morrison, 2005).  
For example, Halford et al. (2005) had subjects view graphical representations of 
two-, three-, and four-way interactions, which entail two, three, and four variable-value 
bindings, respectively. The subjects’ task was to indicate whether “greater” or “smaller” 
would correctly complete the final sentence of a verbal description of each graph.  For 
example, in the three-way problem shown in Figure 1 the verbal description was: “People 
prefer fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs. 
carrot) and the type (iced vs. plain). The difference between fresh and frozen increases 
from chocolate cakes to carrot cakes. This increase is (greater/smaller) for iced cakes than 
for plain cakes.” (Halford et al., 2005; p. 71). Halford et al. found that subjects’ error 
rates increased with the order of the interaction. In Experiment 2, when the researchers 
increased the number of variables to 5, subjects performed at chance. In broad agreement 
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with Luck and Vogel (1997), these researchers concluded that the capacity of WM is 
roughly four variable-value bindings. Numerous other experiments have converged on a 
similar estimate for the capacity of WM (see Cowan, 2000, for a review; but see Vogel et 
al., 2001).   
Although there is comparatively broad agreement that the capacity of working 
memory is roughly 3-5 items (but see Alvarez & Cavanagh 2004; Alvarez & Oliva 2008; 
Oliva & Torralba 2006; Vogel et al., 2001), what remains less clear is precisely what 
these “items” are. As noted previously, the literature on visual WM tends to discuss items 
as objects (i.e., bound collections of object features), whereas the cognitive literature 
tends to define the items as variable-value (role-filler) bindings. That these two 
conceptions are not necessarily consistent becomes clear when one asks about the 
capacity of visual WM for the spatial relations among objects in a display. It is known 
that perceiving spatial relations requires visual attention (Logan, 1994) and therefore 
consumes working memory resources. 
Consider, for example, a four-object display and imagine that an observer is 
tasked with remembering three spatial relations among the objects in the display (e.g., for 
any given pair of objects, which is larger than the other, which is above the other and 
which is right-of the other; Figure 2). According to the items-as-objects account, the WM 
load imposed by this task is simply the number of objects in the display. With a capacity 
of 4 + 1 objects, it should be easy to perceive all the relations among the four objects in 
Figure 2. But if the items that occupy WM are role filler bindings, as suggested by the 
items-as-role-bindings account, then the load imposed by three relations among each of 
four objects should scale as r(n2-n), where r is the number of relations in the vocabulary 
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(e.g., 3 in the current example), and n is the number of objects to be related. Three 
relations among four objects comes to 36 role bindings, vastly exceeding the 4+1 
capacity of WM. These accounts thus make very different predictions about our ability to 
encode in WM the spatial relations among objects in a display. 
Both the items-as-objects and the items-as-role-bindings accounts have important 
limitations as accounts of the representation of the spatial relations among visual objects. 
According to the simplest version of the items-as-objects account, a relational role is just 
another feature on an object. For example, this approach would represent the fact that 
object 2 in Figure 2 is larger than object 1 by including larger among the features of 2 
and smaller among those of 1 (see, e.g., Hummel & Biederman, 1992; for a related 
proposal, see Franconeri, 2012). This approach works well as long as there are only two 
objects in the display, but it fails catastrophically with three or more objects. For 
example, object 2 is larger than both 0 and 1 (and would therefore have the feature larger 
bound to its representation) and smaller than object 3 (and would therefore also have 
smaller bound to its representation). The resulting representation would specify that 2 is 
both larger and smaller than something, but it would fail to specify what, specifically, it is 
larger or smaller than. (Hummel and Biederman observed that this property of their JIM 
model of object recognition constituted a novel prediction—one that was soon falsified 
by Logan & Compton, 1996.) This prediction of the strict items-as-objects account of 
visual WM seems absurd on its face, but it is at least logically possible that it is 
empirically true of human visual WM (modulo Logan & Compton, 1996); and, more 
importantly, it really is a prediction of the account.   
Role-filler based representations of the kind postulated by the items-as-bindings 
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account (including both traditional symbolic representations [e.g., Anderson, Matessa, 
Lebiere, 1997; Faulenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989] and symbolic-connectionist 
representations [e.g., Doumas, Hummel & Sandhofer, 2008; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 
2003]) do not suffer from this kind of ambiguity because they represent relations as full-
blown propositions: the propositions larger (1, 0), larger (2, 1), and larger (3, 2) 
explicitly specify which objects are larger than which. However, the disadvantage of this 
kind of representation is that every role binding requires its own slot in WM. For 
example, representing that 2 is both larger-than and above 1 requires the propositions 
larger (2, 1) and above (2, 1): a total of four role bindings—four slots in WM—to 
represent just two relations between two objects. 
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2. A Hybrid Account of Working Memory for Spatial Relations 
An alternative way to represent that 2 is both above and larger than 1 would be to 
“stack” pairs of relational roles onto pairs of objects, in much the same way that the 
items-as-objects approach “stacks” visual features into representations of complete 
objects. For example, rather than explicitly coding the separate propositions larger (2, 1) 
and above (2, 1), encode instead the mixed relation above-and-larger (2, 1). The resulting 
“stacked” representation would consume two, rather than four, slots in WM but would 
leave the question of what was larger than or above what unambiguous. This kind of 
parallel encoding of multiple relations among a single pair of objects is also broadly 
consistent with the massively parallel processing of early and intermediate vision (see 
Hummel & Biederman, 1992): As long as one is calculating and encoding the fact that 2 
is larger than 1, one may as well bring the fact that 2 is also above 1 along for the ride.  
 According to this hybrid account, the load imposed by representing r relations 
among n objects would be simply (n2-n). Under this approach, each object is encoded in 
relation to one other object—eliminating the ambiguity of the items-as-objects 
approach—but with all the roles describing all the relations between two objects 
“stacked” into the two WM “slots” occupied by those objects. Thus, WM capacity for the 
relations among objects would be limited by the number of pairs of objects to be stored, 
regardless of the number of relations between those pairs. 
 Experiment 1 was designed to test which of these three accounts best 
characterizes the capacity of human WM for the spatial relations among objects. On each 
trial, the observer viewed a display of 2, 3, or 4 random polygons differing in color, size, 
and location in the display (see Figure 3), followed by a pattern mask. After the mask, a 
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query appeared consisting of two objects from the display, side-by-side and of the same 
size, with a relation word (“larger”, “above” or “right-of”) between them. The observer’s 
task was to indicate which of the two objects had been larger than the other, above the 
other, or to the right of the other in the previous display.  On any given trial, some 
subjects were always asked about the same relation, others were asked about either of 
two relations, and still others were asked about any of three relations. 
 Each of the accounts reviewed above makes a unique set of predictions about how 
performance on this task should vary as a function of the number of relations to be 
remembered (varied between subjects) and of the number of objects in the original 
display (varied within subjects). The probability, p(c), of responding correctly to any 
given query is p(r), the probability that the queried relation will be remembered (i.e., in 
WM), plus the probability of guessing correctly (0.5 in the case of our 2AFC task) times 
the probability that the item will not have been remembered: 
  p(c) = p(r) + 0.5 * (1-p(r)).      (1) 
  The probability, p(r), of remembering any given relation from the original display 
is the probability that the queried relation will get into a WM “slot”, p(s), times p(r|s), the 
probability that it will remain in that slot until queried:  
p(r) = p(s)p(r|s).     (2) 
The probability of getting into a slot, p(s), is simply number of WM slots, k, divided by 
the load, l, (i.e., the number of items vying to occupy those slots), truncated above 1: 
  
p(s) =
k
l
ù 
û ú 
1
.     (3) 
 These equations describe the predictions of all three models of WM capacity 
described above. The models differ only in how they predict load, l in Eq. 3, will scale 
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with the number of relations to be remembered and the number of objects entering those 
relations. Recall that the items-as-objects model predicts that load, l, is simply n, the 
number of objects; the items-as-bindings model predicts that load is equal to the number 
of role bindings: l = r(n2-n); and the hybrid model predicts that it is simply the number of 
unique object pairs, where ordering within the pair matters (i.e., r(a, b)  r(b, a)): l = n2-
n. Figure 4 summarizes the predicted loads, l, and probabilities p(c) of responding 
correctly for each model at each of three values of r and n. 
 
 
2.1 Experiment 1 Method, Design, and Procedure 
 Experiment 1 was designed as a preliminary test of these predictions. Observers 
performed a task identical to that illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Sixty-three University of Illinois undergraduate students earned course credit for 
participating in the experiment. Each was randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
one, two, or three relations to remember on every trial. In the one- and two-relation 
conditions, assignment of which relations were to be remembered was counterbalanced. 
Stimuli  
 Subjects viewed displays on an Apple Power Mac G5 Desktop computer. Displays 
consisted of two, three or four irregular polygons, which were organized to be 
categorically distinguishable from one another in terms of the spatial relations among 
them. Each polygon could be described as below or above, left- or right-of, and larger or 
smaller than any other polygon on the screen.  Polygons were semi-randomly colored 
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(subject to the constraint that no two polygons be similarly colored) in order to facilitate 
subjects’ memory for them.  
 The query images displayed a pair of objects chosen semi-randomly from the 
original display (i.e., subject to the constraint that equal numbers of objects were chosen 
that either had or had not been touching in the prior display). The objects appeared on the 
screen side-by-side and normalized to be the same size, but otherwise maintained their 
original shape, color, and orientation. The word “larger”, “above”, or “right-of” was 
displayed between the objects in blue and served (in the two- and three-relation 
conditions) to tell the subject which relation to report. 
 
Design and procedure  
 Each trial was structured as follows: After the 500 ms presentation of a fixation 
cross, a 2-, 3-, or 4-object display appeared on the screen for 2000 ms, followed by a 
pattern mask of randomly generated and randomly colored polygons. Subjects were then 
shown the query display consisting of two objects and a relation word. The subjects' task 
was to indicate, with a key press, which object had stood in that relation to the other in 
the original display. The number of objects in the original display (2, 3 or 4) varied within 
subjects but the number of relations to be queried (1, 2 or 3) varied between subjects. 
 In the One Relation condition, each subject was informed of the relation to which 
he or she was to pay attention, and was asked about that same relation on every trial of 
the experiment.  Assignment of relations to subjects was counterbalanced. Subjects in the 
Two Relation condition could be queried about either of two relations on any given trial 
(counterbalanced). Subjects in the Three Relations condition could be queried about any 
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of the three relations on any given trial. In the two- and three-relation conditions, each of 
the possible relations was queried equally often in a random order. 
 For each subject, a session consisted of 15 practice and 70 actual trials. Trials 
were presented in a random order.  
 
2.2 Experiment 1 Results 
 Figure 5 shows the mean proportion of correct responses in all nine conditions. 
 
 The results reveal a main effect of the number of objects (F(2) =22.81,  p 
<0.0001), but no effect of number of relations that could be queried (F(2) = 2.07, p 
=0.129) and no interaction (F(4) = 0.31, p =0.871). There was no effect of type of relation 
queried in either the two- (F(2) = 1.51 p = 0.230) or the three-relation condition (F(2) 
=0.62 p =0.541). 
 We fitted these accuracy data against the predictions of all three models with 
values of k (WM capacity) from 2.0 to 7.1 in increments of 0.1. The best-fitting items-as-
objects model had a k of 2.7 (consistent with the estimate of Vogel et al., 2001) and 
accounted for 89.9% of the variance in subjects’ accuracy. With k = 3.0, this model 
accounts for 83.0% of the variance and with k = 4.0 and k = 5.0 it accounts for 0% of the 
variance. (With k >= 4.0, this model’s performance is at ceiling in all conditions.) The 
best-fitting items-as-bindings model had a k of 5.2 and accounted for 71.2% of the 
variance. With k = 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 this model accounts for 69.0%, 67.5% and 71.0% of 
the variance, respectively. Finally, the best-fitting hybrid model had k = 5.0 and 
accounted for 90.0% of the variance. With k = 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 this model accounts for 
74.2%, 84.8% and 90.0% of the variance, respectively. 
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 In terms of the proportion of subjects’ error variance accounted for, all three 
models provide good fits to the results of Experiment 1. However, for sufficiently large 
values of k, all three models fail to account for any of the variance by predicting ceiling 
effects in all conditions. For the items-as-bindings model, this value is k = 36 (i.e., a 
person who could simultaneously hold 36 role bindings in WM would perform equally 
well in all conditions). For the hybrid model, this value is k = 12. That is, both models 
predict non-zero effects of our experimental manipulations within the normally accepted 
range of 3-5 items for WM capacity. By contrast, the items-as-objects model predicts no 
effects of our manipulations for any value of k equal to or above 4.0. 
 We also calculated Root Mean Squared Difference (RMSD) between the various 
model predictions and the observed accuracy data. With one degree of freedom (fixing 
working memory capacity at 4, allowing only p(r|s) to vary between 0.00 and 1.00 in 
increments of 0.05), the best-fitting hybrid model gives an RMSD of 0.045 (at p(r|s) = 
.75) and the best-fitting items-as-bindings model gives an RMSD of 0.102 (at p(r|s) = 
.85). (Recall that smaller values of RMSD indicate better fits.) Since the items-as-objects 
model accounted for none of the variance in the data with k = 4, we did not compute 
RMSD for that model.  
 With two degrees of freedom (again allowing p(r|s) to vary between 0.00 and 1.00 
in increments of 0.05 and allowing WM capacity to vary from 2.0 to 7.1 in increments of 
0.1), the best-fitting items-as-objects model gives an RMSD of 0.043 at k = 2.3 and p(r|s) 
= .65. The best-fitting items-as-bindings model gives an RMSD of 0.072 at k = 7.1 and 
p(r|s) = .70. And the best-fitting hybrid model gives an RMSD of 0.030 at k = 5.3 and at 
p(r|s) = .65. As is visible in Figure 6, the range of parameter values over which the hybrid 
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model gives small values of RMSD is wider than the corresponding range for either the 
items-as-objects or the items-as-bindings model. 
 It is interesting to note that the best-fitting hybrid model (in the two DF case) has 
a WM capacity closer to the 3-5 range than does the best-fitting items-as-bindings model, 
although even the best-fitting hybrid model appears to have a WM capacity that is 
roughly a point too high relative to the limit of 3-5. As elaborated in the context of 
Experiment 3, this inflated value may reflect subjects’ systematically answering correctly 
on a subset of the trials on which they had not encoded the queried pair into WM. 
Moreover, the best-fitting items-as-bindings model lies at the extreme of the range of 
WM capacities tested, suggesting that the fit could likely be improved further by 
assuming an even more unrealistic WM capacity. For the hybrid and items-as-objects 
models, by contrast, RMSD was non-monotonic in the range of WM capacities tested, 
meaning that further increases in WM capacity would not improve the models’ fits. 
 
2.3 Experiment 1 Conclusions 
 According to both proportion of variance accounted for and RMSD, the hybrid 
model provides the best account of the data from Experiment 1: Accuracy decreased with 
the square of the number of objects, but not with the number of relations between them. 
This finding suggests that relational roles can be “stacked” such that encoding a pair of 
objects in WM entails encoding all the relations between that pair at no additional cost 
(much as additional features of one object can be encoded at no additional cost). This 
result suggests that the visual system may only encode two pairs of objects in WM at a 
time, but that it computes all the relations between the objects in each pair in parallel. 
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More specifically, in a working memory task for visual relations, an item in WM appears 
to be one member of a pair with a stack of relational roles relating it to the other member 
of the same pair. 
One potential objection to Experiment 1 is that we do not know subjects were 
actually computing the spatial relations between the objects and storing them in WM 
during encoding (but see Franconeri et al., 2012; Jung & Hummel, 2009; Roth & 
Franconeri, 2012; Saiki & Hummel, 1996, 1998; Tomlinson & Love, 2006). Perhaps 
instead subjects were simply memorizing the metric details of the display (e.g., in an 
image-like format) and only computing the relevant relations at the time of query. In this 
case, our task would not be a test of WM for relations among objects, but only a test of 
WM for objects. This interpretation of the findings of Experiment 1 is challenged by the 
fact that this “compute the relations after the fact” account predicts the same performance 
as the items-as-objects model. This “after the fact” interpretation is also challenged by the 
results of Experiments 2 and 3. Experiment 3 was designed to test very specific 
predictions of the hybrid model about accuracy as a function of the relation between the 
pairs a subject encodes and those on which she is queried. The items-as-objects model 
accounts for none of the variance in subjects’ accuracy in this experiment, even if the 
capacity of WM is assumed to be less than 4. Experiment 2 was deigned to explicitly 
compare subjects’ memory for relative size to their memory for absolute size and 
provides evidence that observers do, indeed, encode relative size in WM. 
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3. Memory for Absolute Size vs. Memory for Relative Size 
 
 In order to directly test the hypothesis that observers perform the task in 
Experiment 1 by remembering the objects’ absolute sizes and locations and only compute 
their relative sizes and locations at the time of query, Experiment 2 was designed to 
compare subjects’ memory for absolute size to their memory for relative size. (In this 
experiment, as in Experiment 3, we are using relative size as a proxy for all the relations 
investigated in Experiment 1. Recall that Experiment 1 showed no reliable effects of the 
number of relations to be remembered on a trial.) 
On each trial of Experiment 2, the observer saw either a single random polygon or 
two copies of a polygon, side-by-side, differing slightly in size (Figure 7). After a brief 
exposure, this display was replaced by a pattern mask, an inter-stimulus interval (ISI; a 
blank screen) and a test depicting either the same polygon (if the previous display had 
shown a single polygon) or the same pair (if the previous display had shown two). If the 
displays had shown single polygons, then the observer’s task was to say whether the 
second polygon was smaller or larger than the first (i.e., an absolute size comparison 
task). If the displays had shown pairs of polygons, then the task was to say whether the 
size difference between the polygons in the second pair was smaller or larger than the size 
difference between the polygons in the first (i.e., a relative size comparison task). As 
detailed shortly, size differences on the absolute size comparison task (i.e., one polygon 
to one polygon) were numerically equated with size-difference differences on the relative 
size comparison task (i.e., two polygons to two polygons). 
 To the extent that observers encode only absolute size in memory and compute 
relative size only at the time of test, performance on the absolute size judgment should 
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exceed performance on the relative size judgment at all exposure durations and ISIs. In 
this case, the relative size judgment task would require the subject to encode and compare 
four sizes (and compare the results of two size comparisons), whereas the absolute size 
task only requires them to encode and compare two. But to the extent that observers can 
encode relative size explicitly, performance on the absolute and relative size judgment 
tasks might diverge in other ways. 
 One possible divergence concerns the effect of exposure duration. To the extent 
that relative size takes longer to compute and encode than absolute size (e.g., because it is 
based on estimates of absolute size), judgments of absolute size might be more accurate 
than judgments of relative size at short exposure durations. (Or, more generally, any 
advantage for absolute size over relative size might be greater at shorter, rather than 
longer exposure durations, or any advantage for relative size over absolute size might be 
smaller at shorter than longer exposure durations.) 
A second possible divergence concerns the effect of delay between study and test. 
Relative size is a better measure of the distal stimulus than is absolute retinal size (e.g., 
the latter, but not the former, changes with distance from the viewer), so people may be 
biased to encode the relative sizes of objects in memory, rather than their absolute sizes. 
To the extent that this bias holds, judgments of relative size may be more robust to longer 
delays than are judgments of absolute size. 
A third possible divergence is simply in overall accuracy. To the extent that 
numerical differences in absolute and relative size can be equated (as we have done in 
Experiment 2), differences in observers’ ability to detect one vs. the other must reflect 
differences in how they encode the two properties in memory and compare them at test. 
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3.1 Experiment 2a Method, Design, and Procedure 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Sixteen University of Illinois undergraduate students earned course credit for 
participating in this experiment.  All comparisons were within subjects. 
Stimuli  
 Subjects viewed displays on an Apple Power Mac G5 Desktop computer.  The 
experiment was created and run in Python and Pygame. The study and test stimuli in all 
trials consisted of blue randomly generated polygons. We equated the Absolute and 
Relative Size trials by using a fixed set of ratios ([1.04, 1.0816, 1.1.248, 1.1698]) to relate 
study items to test items in both kinds of trials. 
 We generated each absolute size stimulus by creating a randomly-generated 
irregular convex base polygon, b1, whose size (i.e., area on the computer screen) was 
randomly chosen from a square distribution in the range 8,000 to 15,000 pixels. We next 
made a reference polygon, r1, by multiplying the area of b1 by a scaling factor, s1: 
  
r1 = s1b1,      (4) 
s1  (1.04, 1.0816, 1.1.248, 1.1698). Other than the difference in size, b1 and r1 were 
identical. Half the trials presented b1 first and the other presented r1 first and the 
observer’s task was to decide whether the first or second polygon had been larger.   
 We generated the relative size trials as follows. First, we created a pair, p1, of 
polygons, b1 and r1, as described previously. We next created a second pair of polygons, 
p2, identical to the polygons in p1 in shape but not size. Specifically, b2 (the “first” 
member of p2), like b1, took a random size in the range 8000…15,000 pixels. Polygon r2 
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(the “second” member of p2) took as its size the same scaling factor, s1, that related r1 to 
b1 times an additional scaling factor, s2, in the same range: 
  
r2 = s2s1b2,      (5) 
s2  (1.04, 1.0816, 1.1.248, 1.1698). As a result, exactly the same set of ratios relating b1 
to r1 on absolute size trials related pairs polygons, p1 and p2, on relative size trials (i.e., s1 
and s2 were chosen from the same set of values). However, none of the absolute sizes, b1, 
b2, r1 or r2, were the same on any given trial, making it impossible to perform the relative 
size judgment on the basis of the absolute sizes of b1 and b2 (i.e., even though the size 
difference in p2 was always larger than the size difference in p1, b1 was just as likely to be 
larger as smaller than b2). However, by virtue of the way p1 and p2 were constructed, 
there was a small statistical tendency for r2 to be the largest object on any given trial. 
(Specifically, r2 will be the largest object on any trial in which b1 is less than 1.082 larger 
than b2, which is slightly more than half the trials. Experiment 2b was designed to 
explicitly control the appearance of the largest/smallest polygons in the p1/p2 pairs.) On 
half the trials, p1 was presented first and on the other half p2 was presented first. The 
subject’s task was to determine whether the size difference relating the first pair was 
larger or smaller than the size difference relating the second pair. 
 
Design and Procedure  
 The experiment consisted of eight practice trials, followed by 200 trials on which 
accuracy data were collected.  During the experiment, absolute and relative trials were 
randomly intermixed. 
 Absolute size trials consisted of one irregular polygon (b1 or r1) displayed on the 
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screen for 34 ms, 68 ms, 136 ms, 273 ms,  or 544 ms. This display was followed by a 
pattern mask (ISI), which stayed on the screen for 200 ms, 500 ms, 1000 ms or 4000 ms, 
followed by the test display, which remained on the screen until the subject responded. 
The subjects’ task was to indicate whether the first or second polygon had been larger 
using a keypress (see Figure 7a). 
 Relative size trials consisted of one pair of polygons (p1 or p2) displayed on the 
screen for 34 ms, 68 ms, 136 ms, 273 ms,  or 544 ms, followed by a pattern mask (ISI) 
for 200 ms, 500 ms, 1000 ms or 4000 ms.  The test display (p2 or p1) depicted the same 
two pair of polygons, but with a slightly larger or smaller size difference between the 
members of the pair. The subjects’ task was to indicate whether the first or second size 
difference had been larger. The second display remained on the screen until the subject 
responded with a key press (see Figure 7b). 
 In this experiment, exposure duration, ISI and the ratios, s1 and s2, did not vary 
orthogonally. Instead, in one block, the ratios varied while exposure duration and ISI 
were held constant, both at 200 ms. In the other block, the ratios were held constant at 
1.1248 while exposure duration and ISI varied within subjects. The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced. Each block consisted of 200 trials. 
 
3.2 Experiment 2a Results 
Unsurprisingly, as the ratios s1 and s2 increased, so did accuracy on both absolute 
size and relative size trials (F= 65.639, p<.001). More to our current interest, Figure 8 
shows accuracy as a function of exposure duration (averaged over ISI, s1 and s2) and ISI 
(averaged over exposure duration, s1 and s2).  
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As the ISI between initial display and test increased, accuracy decreased on 
absolute size trials, but remained relatively stable on relative size trials across all the 
delays tested. In the relative size condition, there was no reliable difference between 
performance in the shortest (200 ms) and longest (4000 ms) ISIs (t(16) = 0.86, p = 0.40), 
but there was a reliable difference in performance between the shortest and the longest 
ISIs in the absolute size condition (t(16) = 2.68, p = 0.01). As evident in Figure 8, 
exposure duration had no reliable effect on performance in the relative size condition 
(t(16) = 1.71  p = 0.11) but longer exposure durations did facilitate performance relative 
to shorter exposure durations in the absolute size condition (t(16) = 5.89  p < 0.001). 
 
3.3 Experiment 2b Method, Design, Procedure, Results 
 Experiment 2b was a direct replication of the block of Experiment 2a that varied 
exposure duration and ISI except that the stimuli were designed to more precisely control 
the largest and smallest values of both the smaller (b1 and b2) and larger (r1 and r2) 
members of p1 and p2 in the relative size condition. Specifically, the absolute sizes of the 
individual polygons on relative size trials were staggered as illustrated in Figure 9, 
ensuring that b2 was the smallest polygon on 60% the trials with b1 the smallest on the 
other 40%, and r2 was the largest polygon on 60% the trials with r1 the largest on the 
other 40%. As such, responding only to the largest or the smallest polygon in any pair of 
pairs would ensure 60% correct performance, and responding to both the largest and 
smallest would ensure correct performance on 20% of the trials (see Figure 9). 
 This staggering was accomplished by first setting the size of b1 to a value between 
8000 and 15,000 pixels and r1 to a size value based on b1 and s1, as described above (Eq. 
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4). (In this experiment s1 was randomized to a value in the set (1.04, 1.0816, 1.1.248, 
1.1698) on each trial and s2 varied within subjects as in Experiment 2a.) To construct a 
[b1,r1,b2,r2] trial (row 1, Fig. 9), we set b2 to the size of r1 plus a random number of pixels 
between 0 and 1000 and then set r2 to b2 times the larger relation size, s1s2 (Eq. 5). To 
construct a [b1,b2, r1,r2] trial (row 2, Fig. 9), we set b2 to a value halfway between b1 and 
r1 and then set r2 = b2s1s2 (Eq. 5). To construct a [b2, b1, r1,r2] trial (row 3, Fig. 9), we set 
r1 to b1s1, b2 to b1, and r2 to r1. We then iteratively made b2 smaller and r2 larger until the 
ratio (r2/b2)/( r1/ b1) = s2. To construct a [b2, r2,b1,r1] trial (i.e., row 4, Fig. 9), we set r2 to 
b1 minus a random number of pixels between 0 and 1000 and then set b2 so that relation 
r2/b2 was equal to s2 times the relation r1/b1. That is, b2 = (s2r1)/(r2r1) so that r2 = b2s1s2 
(Eq. 5). To construct a [b2, b1,r2, r1] trial (i.e., row 5, Fig. 9), we set the size of r2 to a 
value halfway between b1 and r1 and then set b2 = (s2r1)/(r2r1) so that r2 = b2s1s2 (Eq. 5). 
 In all other respects, Experiment 2b was identical to the block of Experiment 2a 
that varied ISI and exposure duration except that (a) as noted previously, we randomized 
s1 on a trial-by-trial basis and (b) the shortest exposure duration we tested was 17ms (i.e., 
one screen refresh) rather than 34ms. 
 
Results 
Just as in Experiment 2a, accuracy decreased with increasing ISI for absolute size 
trials, but remained relatively stable for relative size trials. In the relative size condition, 
there was no reliable difference between performance in the shortest (200 ms) and 
longest (4000 ms) ISIs (t(20) = 1.39, p = 0.17), but there was a reliable difference in 
performance between the shortest and the longest ISIs in the absolute size condition 
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(t(20) = 3.09, p = 0.005).  
Also, though the shapes of the lines appear different for Experiment 2a and 2b for 
exposure duration, the reliable pattern remains the same between the two experiments.  
That is, exposure duration had no reliable effect on performance in the relative size 
condition (t(20) = 1.59  p = 0.12) but longer exposure durations did facilitate 
performance relative to shorter exposure durations in the absolute size condition (t(20) = 
3.22  p = 0.004). 
 
3.4 Experiment 2 Conclusions 
 Experiment 2 demonstrated qualitative differences between observers’ memory 
for absolute and relative size. Most strikingly, subjects’ memory for relative size was in 
general more accurate than their memory for absolute size (i.e., around 75% vs. 70% 
accuracy on our tasks, respectively). Memory for relative size also lasted longer than 
memory for absolute size, although over the durations we tested this effect was modest. 
Interestingly, memory for relative was superior to memory for absolute size at all the 
exposure durations we tested. This result suggests that relative size can be computed and 
encoded very rapidly, at least under the presentation conditions to which we exposed our 
observers. 
 Most importantly for our current purposes, these results suggest that observers can 
and do compute and encode relative size as a property of two objects in it’s own right: It 
is not the case that people only encode absolute size and compute relative size later, as 
required by the task in which they are engaged. Of course, this result does not imply in 
any strong sense that the subjects in Experiment 1 were encoding our displays in terms of 
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the relations among the depicted objects, only that they were at least capable of doing so 
and that, to the extent that Experiment 1 required our subjects to make “fine” (for some 
definition of “fine”) discriminations between the objects in terms of size or location, it 
would have been in their best interest to do so. 
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4. Computational Model and Experiment 3 
Based on mathematical instantiations of the items-as-objects, items-as-bindings 
and hybrid models of WM for spatial relations, the results of Experiment 1 provided 
support for the hybrid account. This model accounted for the largest proportion of the 
variance in subject’s accuracy on the object-relation memory task and provided the 
closest fit to the subjects’ data in terms of RMSD. 
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1. 
Whereas Experiment 1 was designed to test the broad performance predictions of abstract 
mathematical instantiations of each of the three models, Experiment 3 was designed to 
test more nuanced predictions of the hybrid model itself. To the extent that the hybrid 
model provides an accurate account of the manner in which we encode the spatial 
relations among objects into visual WM, it ought to be able to predict not only overall 
accuracy but also specific patterns of accuracy as a function of the relations between the 
objects and relations the observer encodes into WM and those on which she is 
subsequently queried. 
In order to test these more nuanced predictions, we first constructed a process 
version of the hybrid model—i.e., a version of the model that actually performs the 
observer’s task—and observed the model’s accuracy as a function of (a) which object 
pairs it had encoded into WM on a given trial and (b) the pair on which it was queried on 
that trial. We tested the model on all possible combinations of encodings and queries.  
 
4.1 The Computational Model Structure 
 The fundamental tenet of the hybrid model is that two pairs of objects can be held 
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in WM, along with all the relations between the objects within each pair. Accordingly, the 
process version of the model encodes pairs of objects in memory along with all the 
relations (larger, above and right-of) between the members of each pair. We simulated 
each trial of Experiment 1 in two phases, an encoding phase and a test phase. During 
encoding, the model stores two pairs of objects in memory in terms of their shapes and 
the spatial relations within each pair. Queried with a pair of objects during test, the model 
compares the queried objects to the pairs it has stored in memory and attempts to activate 
spatial relations based on the match between the queried pair and the stored pairs. The 
relations so activated serve as the model’s estimate of the likely relation between objects 
and query.  This estimate is what the model is estimating memory to be. Based on this 
estimate, the model generates a response, such as “object 1 was larger than object 0”, 
which is compared to the correct relation in order to determine the accuracy of the 
model’s response. 
 In the model’s memory, displays such as those used in Experiment 1 are encoded 
at three hierarchical levels: (1) as objects bound to specific relational roles (that is, object 
0 bound to smaller, right-of and above); (2) pairs of objects in specific collection of 
relations to one another (e.g., smaller, right-of, above (object 0, object 1)); and (3) 
collections of two such pairs. During the test phase, the model’s response to a queried 
pair is based on the match between the objects in that pair and the relations and relational 
roles encoded in the model’s memory. 
The model is an eight-layer artificial neural network based loosely on Hummel 
and Biederman’s (1992) JIM model of object recognition. Layers 3 through 7 of the 
hybrid model are numbered according to the corresponding layers of the JIM model. The 
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model’s third layer represents objects (random polygons from Experiments 1 and 3) in 
terms of their identity (one unit per polygon; “Shape Attrib. Units” in Figure 10, Layer 3), 
location in the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the visual field (10 units each in 
Layer 3) and size (10 units in Layer 3). Units in Layer 7 encode collections of polygons 
in specific arrangements corresponding to entire encoding displays from Experiments 1 
and 3 (for reference, see Figure 2 in the main text; see also Figure 10). Units in Layer 4 
compute (Layer 4) and represent (Layer 5) the relative sizes and locations of the 
polygons. Units in Layer 5 store polygons in specific relational role bindings into 
memory (for example: “polygon1+larger+left_of+below”; Layer 6), pairs of polygons in 
specific stacks of relations (for example: “larger+left_of+below (polygon1, polygon0)”; 
Layer 6.5) and whole configurations (for example: encoding displays; Layer 7) into the 
model’s memory.  
Units in Layers 1 and 2 serve as “attentional control” units that represent and 
activate specific polygons at specific sizes and locations in the visual field (e.g., 
“polygon1+size=3+h_location=2+v_location=3”; Layer 2) and specific pairs of polygons 
(e.g., “polygon0 and polygon1”; Layer 1). The model attends to a pair of polygons by 
activating the corresponding Layer 1 unit, which activates the Layer 2 units to which it is 
connected (e.g., the Layer 1 unit for “polygon0 and polygon1” would activate the Layer 2 
units for polygons 0 and 1). Layer 2 units mutually inhibit one another so that, in 
response to a fixed excitatory input (i.e., from a Layer 1 unit), they will oscillate out of 
synchrony with one other, for example with the polygon0 unit firing first, followed by 
polygon1, followed by polygon0, etc. (see Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997, 2003). In response to the activation of a single Layer 1 unit, the result on 
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Layer 3 is two mutually desynchronized patterns of activation: One representing 
polygon0 in terms of its identity/shape, size and location, and the other representing 
polygon1 in terms of its identity/shape, size and location. These synchrony/asynchrony 
relations, imposed by the units in Layer 2, are carried forward through Layers 3…6 and 
represent the bindings of polygons to their basic attributes (Layer 3) and their relations to 
one another (Layers 5 and 6). Units in Layer 6 learn to respond to conjunctions of units in 
Layers 3 and 5 (and thus represent polygons in specific relational roles), and units in 
Layer 6.5 learn to respond to specific conjunctions of units in Layer 6 (and thus represent 
pairs of polygons in specific relations). Layer 1 units (corresponding to pairs of polygons) 
are activated, one at a time (two Layer 1 units per display), with the result that the model 
processes and encodes polygons in pairs. Units in Layer 7 learn to respond to 
conjunctions of units in Layer 6.5 and thus come to represent pairs of pairs of polygons, 
i.e., approximations of entire encoding displays (as elaborated in the main text). 
All the units composing the model are basic leaky integrators (with the exception 
of those in Layer 1, whose activations are simply set by the user, and those in Layer 4, 
described below): 
       (1) 
where ai is the activation of unit i, ni is the net (excitatory plus inhibitory) instantaneous 
input to i, and  and  are grown and decay rates, respectively. Units in Layer 4 act as 
AND-gates, which represent conjunctions of metric values and relational roles (e.g., 
larger-and-size5) and take as their activation the product of the activation of the 
corresponding metric unit in Layer 3 (here, size5) and the time-delayed activations of all 
other relevant Layer 3 units (here, size1…size4, i.e., all sizes smaller than size5). In this 
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way, the units in Layer 4 form comparitor circuits that take metric values (e.g., specific 
sizes) as input and produce categorical relations (e.g., larger and smaller) as output on 
Layer 5 (see Doumas, et al., 2008; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). All learning in the 
model is performed by the simple Hebbian rule: 
Dwij = f (aia j ),       (3) 
where wij is the (excitatory) connection weight from unit j to unit i. All inhibitory weights 
in the model have fixed values of -1.0. 
The model’s basic large-scale operations consist of encoding (i.e., encoding a 
display into memory during the encoding phase of Experiments 1 and 3) and retrieval 
(i.e., probed with a pair of polygons, attempting to recover their relations, as in the query 
phase of Experiments 1 and 3).  
During encoding, pairs of polygons are presented to the model (one pair at a time) 
by activating units in Layer 1. These units activate Layer 2 units, which become active 
(“fire”) out of synchrony with one another, imposing patterns of activation on Layer 3, 
each of which represents a single polygon in terms of its shape and metric properties (size 
and location). These patterns of activation propagate forward through the model’s higher 
layers, with the result that the display is encoded in the mdoel’s memory as two pair of 
polygons (Layer 7), with every relation encoded between the members of each pair 
(Layers 6 and 6.5). 
Retrieval works just like encoding with the following exceptions. (1) The units in Layer 2 
activate representations the polygons in terms of their shapes (“Shape Attrib.” units in 
Layer 3), but not their locations or sizes. This convention corresponds to our practice 
(Experiments 1 and 3) of presenting the polygons at query centered on the screen and of 
 29 
equal sizes. (2) Rather than encoding the resulting patterns of activation in Layers 6…7, 
existing units in those layers (established during the corresponding encoding phase) are 
activated (by the Shape Attrib. units in Layer 3) and allowed to feed activation backward, 
from Layer 7 to Layer 6.5, from 6.5 to 6 and from 6 to 5, activating a representation of 
the likely relations between those polygons in the corresponding encoding phase. In other 
words, during retrieval, the model attempts to remember or infer what the relation 
between the polygons had been during the corresponding phase. The relations so 
activated during this phase are taken as the model’s response on that retrieval trial. For 
example, if queried with polygons 0 and 1 in Figure 10, the model activates larger in 
synchrony with 1 and smaller in synchrony with 0, then we take that pattern of activation 
as the model responding that 1 had been larger than 0 in the encoded stimulus 
 
 
4.2 Model Simulations and Predictions  
 
All our simulations used four-object displays, since such displays afford the 
richest set of potential pairs for encoding and test that can be compared to the conditions 
of Experiment 1. In a four-object display there are six (6 = (42 – 4)/2) unique pairs of 
objects to use as queries and 15 (15 = (62 – 6)/2) unique pairs of pairs to use for encoding, 
for a total of 90 possible trial types (where a trial is defined by the pair of pairs encoded 
and the pair queried; see Table 1). These predictions fall into 6 categories. 
1) Encoded is when the queried pair is one of the ones the model encoded. For 
example, if the model encodes pair [0, 1] and pair [1, 2] and is then queried about [0, 1], 
it is likely to report the correct relation between 0 and 1 because it had encoded it. 
2) Right for the wrong reason is when the model can get the correct answer 
without having encoding the queried pair. For example, if the model encodes [0, 1] and 
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[2, 3] and is queried on [0, 3] then it should answer correctly that 0 was smaller than 3 
because 0 is encoded (in the first level of the hierarchy) as smaller-than something and 3 
is encoded as larger-than something. 
3) One role binding (1RB in Table 1) is when the model encodes only one of the 
role bindings on which it is queried, for example, encoding [0, 1] and [0, 3] then being 
queried on [0, 2]. Even though the model doesn’t know anything about object 2, it knows 
that 0 is smaller than something and so it may have an opportunity to guess the correct 
answer. 
4) Ambiguous occurs either (a) when both queried objects are encoded in the same 
role or (b) when only one of the encoded objects is queried, and that object was encoded 
in both roles.  An example of (a) is when the model encodes [0, 2] and [1, 3] and is 
queried on [0, 1] then it knows that 0 is smaller than something and 1 is smaller than 
something, leaving it unclear which of these two had been smaller than the other. An 
example of (b) is when the model encodes [0, 1] and [1, 2] and is queried on [1, 3]. In this 
case, it knows nothing about 3, and the two bindings it knows about 1 contradict one 
another.  
5) Misleading is when one encoded role binding points in the wrong direction.  
For example, if the model encodes [0, 3] and [2, 3] and is queried on [1, 2] then it has 
encoded 2 as smaller than something even though 2 was in fact larger than 1 (a relevant 
fact the model failed to encode). 
6) Deeply misleading occurs when the model encodes [0, 1] and [2, 3] and then is 
queried on [1, 2]. It has encoded that 1 was larger than something and that 2 was smaller, 
so it is very unlikely to answer correctly that 1 had actually been smaller than 2. 
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Figure 12(a) illustrates the proportion of the model’s correct responses over 100 
runs of all 90 possible encoding X query pairings. In the cases of Encoded and Right for 
the wrong reason, the model performs near ceiling. In the cases of One role binding, 
Ambiguous, and Misleading, the model performs near chance.  And in the case of Deeply 
misleading, the model nearly always answers incorrectly.      
 Figure 12(b) depicts predicted accuracy in Experiment 3 if subjects encode the 
objects’ absolute sizes at encoding and only compute their relative sizes at the time of 
query. These predictions are based on a WM capacity, k, of 4.0 and p(r|s) = 1.0, but the 
ordinal predictions remain exactly the same (i.e., with all values scaled toward 0.5) if k is 
assumed to be less than 4.0 or p(r|s) is assumed to be less than 1.0. 
 
4.3 Experiment 3 Method, Design, and Procedure 
 The simulation results in Figure 12(a) constitute detailed predictions about 
subjects’ performance with four-object displays as a function of which pairs they happen 
to encode on a given trial and the pair on which they are queried. Experiment 3 was 
designed to test these predictions. Every trial of Experiment 3 presented subjects with a 
four-object display to encode and queried them about which of two objects had been 
larger in that display (recall that the effect of Number of Relations was not reliable in 
Experiment 1, so we held that variable constant in Experiment 3).  
Although it is straightforward to experimentally manipulate the pair on which a 
subject is queried on any given trial, it is more challenging to manipulate the pairs they 
happen to encode. To this end, Experiment 3 manipulated the timing of the presentation 
of the objects in the encoding displays (Figure 13). On each trial, two of the four to-be-
encoded objects were presented first for 100 ms, followed by the four-object display as a 
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whole (1000 ms), followed by two of those objects for 100 ms. Our intuition was that 
presenting pairs of objects in isolation before and after the display as a whole would bias 
subjects to encode the relations between the objects in those pairs. Accordingly, the 
objects presented first and last on any given trial were chosen to correspond to the rows 
of Table 1. To the extent that the process model provides an accurate account of the 
manner in which people perform our task, subjects’ performance as a function of the 
encoding and query manipulations ought to conform to the model predictions presented 
in Figure 12(a).  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Forty-eight University of Illinois undergraduate students earned class credit for 
participating in the experiment.  
Stimuli  
 The stimuli were like those of Experiment 1, except all stimuli presented four 
objects. 
Design and procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1. Subjects viewed objects on an 
Apple Power Mac G5 Desktop computer. First a fixation cross was presented, then the 
display, pattern mask, and finally a query followed by accuracy feedback.  In this 
experiment, however, we were interested in comparing the six categories of accuracy 
predictions from the model to the performance of human subjects. For this reason, only 
four-part objects were used and only one relation (larger/smaller) was queried. 
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In order to compare pairs encoded by the subject on a given trial to the query, the 
displays appeared on the screen in a way designed to encourage subject to encode 
particular pairs of objects into WM (see Figure 13).  Specifically, one pair of objects was 
presented for 100 ms, then the whole display for 1000 ms, then the second pair remained 
alone on the screen for 100 ms. All of the fifteen possible part pairings (rows in Table 1) 
were presented equally often. 
 A session consisted of 15 practice and 90 actual trials. Trials were constructed to 
match the conditions depicted in Table 1. 
 
4.4 Experiment 3 Results 
Figure 14 shows subjects’ accuracy in each of the six categories of conditions. 
The data closely match the hybrid model predictions (r2 = 0.88). In contrast to the model, 
the subjects showed a strong recency effect, in that they had a better memory for the 
second pair of objects presented during encoding than the first pair (t(47) = 4.17 , p < 
0.001 ). Considering only the pairs subjects encoded second during encoding, r2 increases 
to .93. By contrast, the items-as-objects model (Figure 12b) accounts for only .003 
(0.3%) of the variance in subjects’ accuracy. 
The model predicted that memory for encoded and right for the wrong reasons 
would be better than memory for one role binding, ambiguous, and misleading. The 
subjects’ data exhibited the same pattern (t(47) = 2.44, p =0.01 ). However, counter to the 
model’s prediction, performance in one role binding, ambiguous, and misleading was not 
reliably better than performance in deeply misleading (t(47)=1.65 , p = 0.10 ) 
The baseline value depicted in Figure 14 corresponds to accuracy in the four-
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object, one-relation condition from Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, performance in the 
deeply misleading condition was numerically worse than baseline performance, although 
this difference was not statistically reliable (t(20) = 1.29, p = 0.208).   
 
4.5 Experiment 3 Conclusions 
When recency effects are excluded from the subjects’ data, the process model 
accounts for 93% of the variance in subjects’ accuracy in Experiment 3. As predicted, 
accuracy is higher in encoded and right for the wrong reasons than in one role binding, 
ambiguous, misleading, and deeply misleading. The only case in which performance fell 
numerically below baseline was deeply misleading. Along with the results of Experiment 
1 these results are consistent with the hybrid model’s prediction that we can hold two 
pairs of objects in WM, along with all the relations between the objects within each pair. 
These results also stand in stark contrast to the predictions of the items-as-objects model, 
or any model that assumes that subjects hold absolute size in WM and compute relative 
size only at the time of query. 
One notable difference between the model’s performance and that of the human 
subjects is that the model’s accuracy varies between zero and one, whereas subjects’ 
accuracy is bounded between chance (50%) and one. Although the reason for this 
difference is not completely clear, one likely explanation is that the model, unlike the 
human subject, cannot guess when the evidence it gets from the feedback from memory 
is weak: The model simply compares activation accumulated in units representing larger 
and smaller and responds when a threshold difference is reached. It is not sensitive to the 
strength of the evidence that led to that difference. The human observer, by contrast, may 
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have some sense of the strength of the evidence she brings to bear on her decision and is 
more likely to guess when that evidence is weak. A more important difference between 
the model and our human observers is that the model could only encode those pairs we 
told it to on any given simulation. Our experimental manipulation, by contrast, serves 
merely to bias subjects to encode some object pairs over others. To the extent that this 
biasing effect is imperfect, subjects can be expected to encode pairs other than those we 
intended on any given trial. 
Another interesting property of the simulation results and the subjects’ data is that 
the model predicted slightly better performance in the right-for-the-wrong-reason 
condition than in the encoded condition and a trend toward a similar pattern is visible in 
the human data (although the difference is not statistically reliable). In the model, this 
difference derives from the fact that a right-for-the-wrong-reason response is driven by a 
larger number of pairs of objects in memory than is an encoded response. Specifically, 
right-for-the-wrong-reason activates two objects in two separate pairs in memory (one for 
each pair in which each object participated; recall that right-for-the-wrong-reason trials 
present, at test, objects the subject/model has encoded in relations consistent with the 
right answer, just not in the same pair). By contrast, encoded activates two objects in 
memory but only one pair. Due to the nonlinearity of the activation function of the units 
composing the model, this two-and-two vs. two-and-one difference is sufficient to 
generate more evidence for the right answer in the case of right-for-the-wrong-reason 
than in the case of encoded. It is tempting to wonder whether a similar effect was 
operating in the visual systems of the human subjects.  
The fact that the process model can respond correctly to some queries it had not 
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encoded into memory (e.g., in the case of right for the wrong reason and one role-
binding) has important implications for our estimates of the capacity of WM on tasks 
requiring memory for the spatial relations among objects. Recall that the RMSD fits of 
the data from Experiment 1 to the predictions of (the mathematical version of) the hybrid 
model yielded an estimated WM capacity of 5.3, which is above the normally accepted 
range of 3-5. We speculate that the model’s (and, by hypothesis, human’s) ability to 
exceed the 4+1 capacity limit reflects the role of retrieval-based heuristics, such as those 
used by the model, that make it possible to make intelligent guesses. 
To this end, we used RMSD to fit the simulations results of the process model 
against the mathematical version of the hybrid model (in a manner precisely analogous to 
that in which we fit the human data; i.e., for the purposes of this analysis, we treated the 
process model as a human subject). For this analysis, we assumed that the model would 
perform perfectly in the two-object condition of Experiment 1. The model’s WM 
capacity is set to exactly 4, and its p(r|s) = 1.0, so there is no reason why it should make 
any errors in the two-object case. In the three-object condition of Experiment 1, the 
process model is expected to perform at mean accuracy of 0.89: On 7 of the 9 possible 
encoding/query pairs, the model will have encoded the queried pair (giving it a p(c)) = 
1.0) and on the remaining two, it will have encoded one role-binding (giving it a p(c) = 
0.5), for a total of 8/9 = 0.89 overall proportion correct in that condition. And for the 
four-object condition of Experiment 1 (which is equivalent to Experiment 2), the model 
achieved an overall accuracy of 0.66. With these numbers, the best RMSD fit of the 
process model simulations to the mathematical version of the hybrid model yields RMSD 
= 0.021at WM capacity 4.5 and p(r|s) = 1.0 (see Figure 15). That is, the model, like our 
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human subjects, best fits a WM capacity slightly greater than 4.0. And, crucially, it did so 
in spite of the fact that we explicitly built it to have a WM capacity of exactly 4.0. We 
take this result as strong suggestive evidence that our human subjects’ seemingly 
exaggerated WM capacity in Experiment 1 may reflect retrieval/relation-matching 
strategies similar to those used by the process model. 
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5. Conclusions and Discussion 
The literature on working memory (WM), from both the study of visual WM (e.g. 
Luck & Vogel, 1997) and WM in memory and reasoning (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1975; 
Halford et al., 2005) suggests that, for most people and across many tasks, people can 
hold and manipulate about 3-5 “items” in WM at a time. However, this apparent 
agreement about the capacity of WM belies an implicit disagreement about the currency 
of WM: In the vision literature, the “items” occupying WM are assumed to be objects 
(i.e., bound collections of object features) whereas in the literature on memory and 
reasoning, these “items” are assumed to be role-filler (or, equivalently, variable-value) 
bindings. The importance of this implicit disagreement becomes apparent when one poses 
the question, What is the capacity of visual WM for the spatial relations among objects in 
a visual display? 
According to the traditional visual account, which holds that WM load scales with 
the number of objects to be remembered, people ought to have no difficulty remembering 
the spatial relations among up to four (or at least 2.8; Vogel et al., 2001) objects. But 
according to the traditional account from memory and reasoning, which holds that load 
scales with the number of role bindings to be encoded, remembering, say, three relations 
among just four objects ought to impose a catastrophically large load of 36 role bindings. 
According to the hybrid account proposed here, WM load should scale with the square of 
the number of to-be-encoded objects (as predicted by the items-as-bindings account) but 
should be unaffected by the number of relations to be encoded by the members of each 
pair (as predicted by the items-as-objects account from the vision literature). 
Experiment 1 evaluated these three accounts as mathematical models that predict 
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performance on an object relation memory task as a function of the number of objects to 
be remembered and the number of relations to be remembered among those objects. The 
results supported the hybrid model, which accounted for 90% of the variance in subject’s 
accuracy on this task. Experiment 2 compared observers’ memory for objects’ relative 
sizes to their memory for objects’ absolute sizes and found that the two kinds of memory 
are differentially sensitive to the time between encoding and test, an effect that suggests 
that observers can encode relative size in memory explicitly, as a visual property in its 
own right (i.e., it is not something we simply compute after the fact by storing objects’ 
absolute sizes in memory). Experiment 3 tested the predictions of a process version of the 
hybrid model. Rather than simply predicting accuracy as a function of the number of 
objects and relations to be remembered (as tested in Experiment 1), this model makes 
detailed predictions about subjects’ performance as a function of which object pairs they 
encode during study and which they are tested on at query. Ignoring recency effects in 
subjects’ performance (which the model, with its perfect memory, does not show), this 
model accounts for 93% of the variance in subjects’ accuracy on an object relation 
memory task. 
Together, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that observers can represent visual 
relations (at least relative size) explicitly in WM, and those of Experiments 1 and 3 
support the hypothesis that visual WM can hold roughly two pairs of objects along with 
all the spatial relations between the members of each pair. These results have a number of 
counterintuitive implications for our understanding of the capacity and currency of visual 
WM. 
First, they suggest that conceptualizing the currency of WM simply as “objects” 
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or as “role-bindings” is too simple. Visual WM, at least, appears to be more intelligent 
than that, encoding pairs of objects in pairs of “slots”, but “stacking” all the relations 
between the objects into the same “slots” in WM. This approach avoids both the 
ambiguity of the purely object-based account (e.g., making it possible to know, not only 
that object 1 is larger than something, but also to know what, specifically, it is larger 
than), and the large WM resources demanded by the pure items-as-bindings account (e.g., 
36 “slots” to hold just three relations among four objects). In this sense, the hybrid 
account seems like an intelligent compromise between these two traditional accounts of 
the currency of WM. 
A second counterintuitive implication of the hybrid model is that an “object”, as 
defined in the stimulus or by the experimenter, is not the same thing as an “object” as 
defined in terms of the resource limitations of WM: In the stimulus (and probably in the 
mind of the experimenter), object 1 in Figure 2 is simply object 1. But if an observer 
encodes, for example, larger (1, 0) and larger (2, 1) into her WM, then object 1 in the 
context of its relation to object 0 occupies a different slot in WM—is effectively a 
different item in the currency of WM—than object 1 in the context of its relation to 
object 2. In this respect (as in many others in experimental psychology), the mind of the 
subject may not respect the definitions assumed in the mind of the experimenter.   
A third implication of the findings reported here, in particular those of Experiment 
3, is that performance on a WM task is not necessarily a straightforward function of the 
relation between the query and the contents of WM. As illustrated by subjects’ high level 
of accuracy in the “right for the wrong reason” condition of Experiment 3, a person may 
perform well on a WM query even if she never actually encoded the relation embodied in 
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the query. In this context, it is important to note that subjects’ high accuracy in this 
condition cannot be attributed to simple, after-the-fact strategies such as reasoning by 
transitive inference (e.g., “I know that object 2 was larger than object 1 and 1 was larger 
than 0, so I can infer that 2 was larger than 0.”). This interpretation is inconsistent with 
the fact that encoding [0, 1] and [2, 3] helps subjects to correctly answer that 3 was larger 
than 0. But since the pairs [0, 1] and [2, 3] share no arguments they do not afford 
transitive reasoning. It appears that, rather than using a rational, deliberative process such 
as transitive inference, our subjects were basing their 3 vs. 0 judgment (and related right 
for the wrong reason judgments) on a process more akin to the retrieval-based heuristic 
embodied in the hybrid model. As illustrated by our subjects’ performance in Experiment 
3, such heuristics may provide a useful (albeit fallible; recall the deeply misleading case) 
basis for making (mostly accurate) relational judgments even in the face of a sharply 
limited WM capacity. 
A related implication of the results of Experiment 3 concerns the difference 
between the subjects’ (and the model’s) performance in the Right for the wrong reason 
and One role binding conditions. In Right for the wrong reason, the model/subject 
encodes two role bindings that both point in the direction of the right answer (e.g., 
encoding both that 0 is smaller and 2 is larger and so answering correctly that 2 was 
larger than 0). In One role binding, only on of these bindings gets encoded. Although in 
principle the one binding could be used to make an educated guess at the right answer, 
neither the model not the human subjects appear to use this information, as evidenced 
both by the superior performance in Right for the wrong reason relative to One role 
binding and by the equivalence of One role binding to, for example, Misleading (where 
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one queried binding is again encoded, but points to the wrong answer). Together, these 
results suggest that the human observer bases her judgments on consistent conjunctions 
of role bindings (e.g., 0 is smaller and 2 is larger), rather than on single bindings in 
isolation (e.g., 2 is larger). This result is inconsistent with any account that simply treats 
relational roles as object features (e.g., Hummel & Biederman’s, 1992, JIM model and 
the items-as objects account from the visual WM literature) or otherwise asymmetrically 
codes relations as properties of a single object (e.g., Roth & Franconeri, 2012). 
Visual processing may be especially well-suited to relational “stacking” as 
embodied in the hybrid model proposed here. Although visual perception is subject to 
attentional bottlenecks at multiple levels of processing, it is also the case that a great deal 
of visual computation goes on in parallel all over the visual field. Such parallel 
processing may naturally afford computing and storing multiple spatial relations between 
a pair of objects at the same time (see Hummel & Biederman, 1992). By contrast, verbal 
stimuli, whether spoken or read, are necessarily processed in a sequential fashion. It is 
interesting to wonder whether the “stacking” strategy the visual system seems to use with 
visual stimuli may also apply to more abstract (including verbal) materials for the 
purposes of “higher” cognition: If one is told that “John loves Mary” and “John is taller 
than Mary”, can one stack those two relations into the single proposition loves-and-taller-
than (John, Mary)? Or must these two propositions, if presented verbally, always require 
four slots in WM? 
Open Questions and Future Directions 
The data presented here do not challenge the well-supported conclusion that the 
capacity of WM is roughly 3-5 “items” across multiple domains in vision and cognition 
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(e.g., Murray, 1968; Peterson & Johnson, 1971; Levy, 1971; Baddeley, Thomson & 
Buchanan, 1975b; Cowan, Wood, Nugent & Treisman, 1997b; Longoni, Richardson, & 
Aiello, 1993; Avons, Wright & Pammer, 1994; Hitch, 1996; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Halford, Baker, McCredden, and Bain, 2005; Song & Jiang, 2006; Woodman & Vogel, 
2008; see Cowan, 2000 and Baddeley, 2003 for reviews ) and they do not speak (at least 
not directly) to the issue of whether the capacity of WM is better conceptualized in terms 
of “slots” or some other, more general, notion of “recources” (e.g. Alvarez and 
Cavanaugh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; Alvarez & Oliva, 2009).  However, they 
underscore the importance of understanding the currency of WM—and understanding the 
operations that use the contents of WM for making judgments—for understanding the 
nature of WM and its role in perception and cognition. 
The findings presented here are preliminary, in that they are based on a restricted 
set of stimuli and behavioral tasks and many open questions remain. Our stimuli were 
intentionally designed to present novel shapes in an impoverished context, so it is unclear 
how our findings will generalize to more natural, or familiar, objects in more natural 
scenes. For example, how would subjects’ performance differ if, say, the relative sizes of 
two objects in a display contradicts or complements their relative sizes as real objects 
(e.g., as when the image of a mouse is larger than the image of a cat). We have also 
discussed our stimuli as collections of “objects”, but it unclear whether perceptually they 
are more naturally thought of as separate objects or as parts of a single object. For 
example, among other things, in every one of our displays, every object appeared to be 
“touching” or overlapping at least one other object. Although we did not mention it in the 
results of Experiment 1, we analyzed subjects’ performance as a function of whether the 
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queried objects had been touching in the study display and found that this variable had no 
effect on performance. In contrast, Saiki & Hummel (1998) found evidence that whether 
two figures appear to touch does affect subjects’ perception of the spatial relations 
between them (specifically, the perceptual binding of the relations to the parts so related). 
Our findings also do not speak to the question of whether our subjects’ errors reflect 
failures of perception, encoding or memory: For example, how would their performance 
change if we doubled or tripled the time they had to look at the displays? Finally, the 
results presented here do not speak to the question of how different kinds of working 
memory may work together (or at odds) in the service of perceiving and remembering 
spatial relations: Are the same cognitive and neural resources responsible for representing 
both objects and the relations between them? Is the perception of and memory for spatial 
relations more impaired by a visual dual task, an executive dual task or a verbal dual 
task? To our knowledge, all of these questions remain largely, if not completely, open. 
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7. Figures & Tables 
.  
Figure 1:  An example of the stimuli from Halford et al.’s (2005) experiments on WM for variables. 
Subjects are presented with a graph as shown here with the following verbal description: ‘‘People prefer 
fresh cakes to frozen cakes. The difference depends on the flavor (chocolate vs. carrot) and the type (iced 
vs. plain). The difference between fresh and frozen increases from chocolate cakes to carrot cakes. This 
increase is (greater/smaller) for iced cakes than for plain cakes.’’  Subjects’ task was to indicate whether 
“greater” or “smaller” was the correct answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Figure 2: A display of four objects (0…3). Encoding three relations (e.g., larger, above and left/right) 
between each pair of objects would entail encoding 36 role bindings: larger (2, 1), below (1,2)… larger (2, 
0)… left-of (3, 2)…etc. 
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Figure 3:  An example of a trial from Experiment 1.  A fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed 
by a 2-, 3-, or 4- object display for 2000 ms. A pattern mask appeared for 500 ms, followed by a query, 
which remained on the screen until the subject responded with a keypress.  The response is followed by 
accuracy feedback. 
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Figure 4: Load and accuracy predictions of the items-as-objects, items-as-bindings, and hybrid accounts. 
The items-as-objects account predicts that performance will vary with the number of objects but not the 
number of relations, at least for WM capacity, k, < 4.  The items-as-bindings account predicts accuracy will 
vary with the number of pairs of objects times the number of relations. The hybrid account predicts 
accuracy will vary with the number of pairs of objects, regardless of the number of relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Mean proportion of correct responses by condition in Experiment 1. Error bars depict the 
standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 6: RMSD plots for the items-as-objects, items-as-bindings and hybrid model fits to the data from 
Experiment 1, varying k (WM capacity) and p(r|s). Darker colors in these plots indicate better fits. White 
indicates RMSD >= 0.13 and successively darker shades of gray indicate steps of 0.01, down to RMSD < 
0.02, which is plotted as black. The best fit (lowest value of RMSD) in each plot highlighted in a red box. 
 
Figure 7: On Absolute Size trials (a), subjects must indicate whether the first (study) or second (test) 
polygon was larger.  On Relative Size trials (b), subjects must indicate whether the first or second size 
difference was larger. 
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Figure 8:  Subjects’ accuracy in Experiment 2a and in 2b as a function of exposure duration and ISI. 
Experiment 2b is a replication of Experiment 2a with more careful control. 
 
 
Figure 9: Illustration of the size staggering used in Experiment 2b. Each row represents the sizes of the 
polygons presented on one kind of relative size trial, with larger polygons depicted to the right in the figure. 
The absolute sizes of the smallest (b1 and b2) and largest (r1 and r2) members of polygon pairs (p1 and p2) 
were controlled so that b1 was the smallest polygon on 40% of the trials (rows 1 and 2) and b2 the smallest 
on the other 60% (rows 3…5) and r1 was the largest polygon presented on 40% of the trials (rows 4 and 5) 
and r2 the largest on the other 60% (rows 1…3). 
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Figure 10: The model represents objects in pairs.  Units filled in the some color are firing (i.e., becoming 
active) in synchrony with one another; those in different colors are firing out of synchrony. Left panel: The 
encoding of the pair [0, 1] of the display illustrated in the lower right of the panel. Orange units represent 
polygon0, those in green polygon1. The yellow unit represents the [0, 1] pair, and the black unit the 
(emerging) display as a whole. Right panel: The encoding of pair [2, 3]. See text for details.   
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Figure 11: Schematic illustration of the six categories of encoding-query sets.  Colored objects in the 
encoded pairs were presented first and last on the encoding trial.  See text for details.  
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Figure 12: (a) Results of 100 runs of the process version of the hybrid model. (b) Predictions of the encode 
size only (i.e., items as objects) model in the same six conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Sequence of events on a trial in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 59 
 
Figure 14: Accuracy as a function of category of response in Experiment 2.  All performance is above 
chance, but ‘deeply misleading’ is below baseline performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Left: RMSD fits of the process model simulation results against the predictions of the 
mathematical version of the hybrid model. Right: For comparison, RMSD fits of human data (Experiment 
1) to the same mathematical model. 
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Table 1: For fifteen possible pairs of parts and 6 possible queries, there are 6 categories of responses from 
the model, which are based on the relationship between the pairs of parts that were encoded and the pair 
queried. 
 
